Category: Privacy & Security

  • Pseudonyms: The Natural State of Online Identity

    I’ve been writing recently about the problems that arise when you try to use cryptography to verify who is at the other end of a network connection. The cryptographic math works, but that doesn’t mean you get the identity part right. You might think, from this discussion, that crypto by itself does nothing — that…

  • China, the Internet and Google: what I planned to say

    In the run-up to and aftermath of Google’s decision yesterday to remove its Chinese search engine from China, I wrote two posts on my personal blog: Chinese netizens’ open letter to the Chinese government and Google and “One Google, One World; One China, No Google” Today, the Congressional Executive China Commission conducted a hearing titled…

  • Side-Channel Leaks in Web Applications

    Popular online applications may leak your private data to a network eavesdropper, even if you’re using secure web connections, according to a new paper by Shuo Chen, Rui Wang, XiaoFeng Wang, and Kehuan Zhang. (Chen is at Microsoft Research; the others are at Indiana.) It’s a sobering result — yet another illustration of how much…

  • Global Internet Freedom and the U.S. Government

    Over the past two weeks I’ve testified in both the Senate and the House on how the U.S. should advance “Internet freedom.” I submitted written testimony for both hearings which can be downloaded in PDF form here and here. Full transcripts will become available eventually but meanwhile you can click here to watch the Senate…

  • Netflix Cancels the Netflix Prize 2

    Today, Netflix announced it is canceling its plans for a second Netflix Prize contest, one that reportedly would have involved the release of more information than the first. As I argued earlier, I feared that the new contest would have put the supposedly private movie viewing and rating habits of Netflix customers at great risk,…

  • Web Security Trust Models

    [This is part of a series of posts on this topic: 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8.] Last week, Ed described the current debate over whether Mozilla should allow an organization that is allegedly controlled by the Chinese government to be a default trusted certificate authority. The post prompted some very insightful feedback,…

  • Mozilla Debates Whether to Trust Chinese CA

    [Note our follow-up posts on this topic: Web Security Trust Models, and Web Certification Fail: Bad Assumptions Lead to Bad Technology] Sometimes geeky technical details matter only to engineers. But sometimes a seemingly arcane technical decision exposes deep social or political divisions. A classic example is being debated within the Mozilla project now, as designers…

  • The Traceability of an Anonymous Online Comment

    Yesterday, I described a simple scenario where a plaintiff, who is having difficulty identifying an alleged online defamer, could benefit from subpoenaing data held by a third party web service provider. Some third parties—like Facebook in yesterday’s example—know exactly who I am and know whenever I visit or post on other sites. But even when…

  • What Third Parties Know About John Doe

    As David mentioned in his previous post, plaintiffs’ lawyers in online defamation suits will typically issue a sequence of two “John Doe” subpoenas to try to unmask the identity of anonymous online speakers. The first subpoena goes to the website or content provider where the allegedly defamatory remarks were posted, and the second subpoena is…

  • Identifying John Doe: It might be easier than you think

    Imagine that you want to sue someone for what they wrote, anonymously, in a web-based online forum. To succeed, you’ll first have to figure out who they really are. How hard is that task? It’s a question that Harlan Yu, Ed Felten, and I have been kicking around for several months. We’ve come to some…