Tag: Voting
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Dutch E-Voting System Has Problems Similar to Diebold's
A team of Dutch researchers, led by Rop Gonggrijp and Willem-Jan Hengeveld, managed to acquire and analyze a Nedap/Groenendaal e-voting machine used widely in the Netherlands and Germany. They report problems strikingly similar to the ones Ari Feldman, Alex Halderman and I found in the Diebold AccuVote-TS. The N/G machines all seem to be opened…
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E-Voting Testimony
Today at 10:00 AM Eastern I’m testifying at a House Administration Committee hearing on e-voting. Here is the written testimony I submitted.
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Networking Diebold Voting Machines
Reacting to our report about their AccuVote-TS e-voting product, Diebold spokesmen are claiming that the machines are never networked. For example, Diebold’s official written response to our report says that the AccuVote-TS “is never attached to a network” and again that “These touch screen voting stations are standalone units that are never networked together.” This…
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Refuting Diebold's Response
Diebold issued a response to our e-voting report. While we feel our paper already addresses all the issues they raise, here is a point by point rebuttal. Diebold’s statement is in italics, our response in normal type. Three people from the Center for Information Technology Policy and Department of Computer Science at Princeton University today…
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"Hotel Minibar" Keys Open Diebold Voting Machines
Like other computer scientists who have studied Diebold voting machines, we were surprised at the apparent carelessness of Diebold’s security design. It can be hard to convey this to nonexperts, because the examples are technical. To security practitioners, the use of a fixed, unchangeable encryption key and the blind acceptance of every software update offered…
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Security Analysis of the Diebold AccuVote-TS Voting Machine
Today, Ari Feldman, Alex Halderman, and I released a paper on the security of e-voting technology. The paper is accompanied by a ten-minute video that demonstrates some of the vulnerabilities and attacks we discuss. Here is the paper’s abstract: Security Analysis of the Diebold AccuVote-TS Voting Machine Ariel J. Feldman, J. Alex Halderman, and Edward…
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E-Voting, Up Close
Recently the Election Science Institute released a fascinating report on real experience with e-voting technologies in a May 2006 primary election in Cuyahoga County, Ohio (which includes Cleveland). The report digs beneath the too-frequent platitudes of the e-voting debates, to see how , poll workers and officials actually use the technology, what really goes wrong…
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Report Claims Very Serious Diebold Voting Machine Flaws
[This entry was written by Avi Rubin and Ed Felten.] A report by Harri Hursti, released today at BlackBoxVoting, describes some very serious security flaws in Diebold voting machines. These are easily the most serious voting machine flaws we have seen to date – so serious that Hursti and BlackBoxVoting decided to redact some of…
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Analysis of Fancy E-Voting Protocols
Karlof, Sastry, and Wagner have an interesting new paper looking at fancy voting protocols designed by Neff and Chaum, and finding that they’re not yet ready for use. The protocols try to use advanced cryptography to make electronic voting secure. The Neff scheme (I’ll ignore the Chaum scheme, for brevity) produces three outputs: a paper…
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New Study on Effects of E-Voting
David Card and Enrico Moretti, two economists from UC Berkeley, have an interesting new paper that crunches data on the 2004 election, to shed light on the effect of touchscreen voting. The paper looks reasonable to me, but my background is not in social science so others are better placed than me to critique it.…