CITP Blog is hosted by Princeton University’s Center for Information Technology Policy, a research center that studies digital technologies in public life. Here you’ll find comment and analysis from the digital frontier, written by the Center’s faculty, students, and friends.
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The OmniBallot internet voting system from Democracy Live finds surprising new ways to be insecure, in addition to the usual (severe, fatal) insecurities common to all internet voting systems. There’s…
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Emergency Motion to Stop Internet Voting in NJ
with Penny Venetis On May 4th, 2020 a press release from mobilevoting.org announced that New Jersey would allow online voting in a dozen school-board elections scheduled for May 12th. On May…
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Fair Elections During a Crisis
Even before the crisis of COVID-19, which will have severe implications for the conduct of the 2020 elections, the United States faced another elections crisis of legitimacy: Americans can no…
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Can Legislatures Safely Vote by Internet?
It is a well understood scientific fact that Internet voting in public elections is not securable: “the Internet should not be used for the return of marked ballots. … [N]o…
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Vulnerability reporting is dysfunctional
By Kevin Lee, Ben Kaiser, Jonathan Mayer, and Arvind Narayanan In January, we released a study showing the ease of SIM swaps at five U.S. prepaid carriers. These attacks—in which…
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Building a Bridge with Concrete… Examples
Thanks to Annette Zimmermann and Arvind Narayanan for their helpful feedback on this post. Algorithmic bias is currently generating a lot of lively public and scholarly debate, especially amongst computer…
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The CheapBit of Fitness Trackers Apps
Yan Shvartzshnaider (@ynotez) and Madelyn Sanfilippo (@MrsMRS_PhD) Fitness trackers are “[devices] that you can wear that records your daily physical activity, as well as other information about your health, such…
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Ballot-level comparison audits: BMD
In my previous posts, I’ve been discussing ballot-level comparison audits, a form of risk-limiting audit. Ballots are imprinted with serial numbers (after they leave the voter’s hands); during the audit,…
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Finding a randomly numbered ballot
In my previous posts, I’ve been discussing ballot-level comparison audits, a form of risk-limiting audit. Ballots are imprinted with serial numbers (after they leave the voter’s hands); during the audit,…
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Why we can’t do random selection the other way round in PCOS RLAs
In my last article, I posed this puzzle for the reader. We want to do ballot-level comparison audits, a form of RLA (risk-limiting audit) on a precinct-count optical-scan (PCOS) voting…