Category: Voting
-
Did NJ election officials fail to respect court order to improve security of elections?
Part 2 of 4 The Gusciora case was filed in 2004 by the Rutgers Constitutional Litigation Clinic on behalf of Reed Gusciora and other public-interest plaintiffs. The Plaintiffs sought to end the use of paperless direct-recording electronic voting machines, which are very vulnerable to fraud and manipulation via replacement of their software. The defendant was…
-
NJ election cover-up
Part 1 of 4 During the June 2011 New Jersey primary election, something went wrong in Cumberland County, which uses Sequoia AVC Advantage direct-recording electronic voting computers. From this we learned several things: New Jersey court-ordered election-security measures have not been effectively implemented. There is a reason to believe that New Jersey election officials have…
-
Why seals can't secure elections
Over the last few weeks, I’ve described the chaotic attempts of the State of New Jersey to come up with tamper-indicating seals and a seal use protocol to secure its voting machines. A seal use protocol can allow the seal user to gain some assurance that the sealed material has not been tampered with. But…
-
Seals on NJ voting machines, as of 2011
Part of a multipart series starting here. During the NJ voting-machines trial, plaintiffs’ expert witness Roger Johnston testified that the State’s attempt to secure its AVC Advantage voting machines was completely ineffective: the seals were ill-chosen, the all-important seal use protocol was entirely missing, and anyway the physical design of this voting machine makes it…
-
Seals on NJ voting machines, March 2009
During the NJ voting-machines trial, both Roger Johnston and I showed different ways of removing all the seals from voting machines and putting them back without evidence of tampering. The significance of this is that one can then install fraudulent vote-stealing software in the computer. The State responded by switching seals yet again, right in…
-
What an expert on seals has to say
During the New Jersey voting machines lawsuit, the State defendants tried first one set of security seals and then another in their vain attempts to show that the ROM chips containing vote-counting software could be protected against fraudulent replacement. After one or two rounds of this, Plaintiffs engaged Dr. Roger Johnston, an expert on physical…
-
The trick to defeating tamper-indicating seals
In this post I’ll tell you the trick to defeating physical tamper-evident seals. When I signed on as an expert witness in the New Jersey voting-machines lawsuit, voting machines in New Jersey used hardly any security seals. The primary issues were in my main areas of expertise: computer science and computer security. Even so, when…
-
Seals on NJ voting machines, October-December 2008
In my examination of New Jersey’s voting machines, I found that there were no tamper-indicating seals that prevented fiddling with the vote-counting software—just a plastic strap seal on the vote cartridge. And I was rather skeptical whether slapping seals on the machine would really secure the ROMs containing the software. I remembered Avi Rubin’s observations…
-
Seals on NJ voting machines, 2004-2008
I have just released a new paper entitled “Security seals on voting machines: a case study” and here I’ll explain how I came to write it. Like many computer scientists, I became interested in the technology of vote-counting after the technological failure of hanging chads and butterfly ballots in 2000. In 2004 I visited my…
-
Unpeeling the mystique of tamper-indicating seals
As computer scientists have studied the trustworthiness of different voting technologies over the past decade, we notice that “security seals” are often used by election officials. It’s natural to wonder whether they really provide any real security, or whether they are just for show. When Professor Avi Rubin volunteered as an election judge (Marylandese for…