Category: Voting
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Seals on NJ voting machines, October-December 2008
In my examination of New Jersey’s voting machines, I found that there were no tamper-indicating seals that prevented fiddling with the vote-counting software—just a plastic strap seal on the vote cartridge. And I was rather skeptical whether slapping seals on the machine would really secure the ROMs containing the software. I remembered Avi Rubin’s observations…
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Seals on NJ voting machines, 2004-2008
I have just released a new paper entitled “Security seals on voting machines: a case study” and here I’ll explain how I came to write it. Like many computer scientists, I became interested in the technology of vote-counting after the technological failure of hanging chads and butterfly ballots in 2000. In 2004 I visited my…
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Unpeeling the mystique of tamper-indicating seals
As computer scientists have studied the trustworthiness of different voting technologies over the past decade, we notice that “security seals” are often used by election officials. It’s natural to wonder whether they really provide any real security, or whether they are just for show. When Professor Avi Rubin volunteered as an election judge (Marylandese for…
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NJ court permits release of post-trial briefs in voting case
In 2009 the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law Division, held a trial on the legality of using paperless direct-recording electronic (DRE) voting machines. Plaintiffs in the suit argued that because it’s so easy to replace the software in a DRE with fraudulent software that cheats in elections, DRE voting systems do not guarantee the…
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Court permits release of unredacted report on AVC Advantage
In the summer of 2008 I led a team of computer scientists in examining the hardware and software of the Sequoia AVC Advantage voting machine. I did this as a pro-bono expert witness for the Plaintiffs in the New Jersey voting-machine lawsuit. We were subject to a Protective Order that, in essence, permitted publication of…
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NJ Voting-machine Trial: Defense Witnesses
I’ve previously summarized my own testimony and other plaintiffs’ witnesses’ testimony in the New Jersey voting machines trial, Gusciora v. Corzine. The defendant is the State of New Jersey (Governor and Secretary of State). The defense case comprised the following witnesses: Defense witness James Clayton, the Ocean County voting machine warehouse supervisor, is a well-intentioned…
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NJ Voting-machine trial: Plaintiffs' witnesses
Both sides in the NJ voting-machines lawsuit, Gusciora v. Corzine, have finished presenting their witnesses. Briefs (in which each side presents proposed conclusions) are due June 15 (plaintiffs) and July 15 (defendants), then the Court will eventually issue a decision. In summary, the plaintiffs argue that New Jersey’s voting machines (Sequoia AVC Advantage) can’t be…
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NJ Voting-machine trial update
Earlier this month I testified in Gusciora v. Corzine, the trial in which the plaintiffs argue that New Jersey’s voting machines (Sequoia AVC Advantage) can’t be trusted to count the votes, because they’re so easily hacked to make them cheat. I’ve previously written about the conclusions of my expert report: in 7 minutes you can…
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Optical-scan voting extremely accurate in Minnesota
The recount of the 2008 Minnesota Senate race gives us an opportunity to evaluate the accuracy of precinct-count optical-scan voting. Though there have been contentious disputes over which absentee ballot envelopes to open, the core technology for scanning ballots has proved to be extremely accurate. The votes were counted by machine (except for part of…
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Security Seals on AVC Advantage Voting Machines are Easily Defeated
On September 2, 2008, I submitted a report to the New Jersey Superior Court, demonstrating that the DRE voting machines used in New Jersey are insecure: it is easy to replace the vote-counting program with one that fraudulently shifts votes from one candidate to another. In Section 10 of my report, I explained that There…