Category: Voting
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Corruption Bureau assigns fox to guard henhouse
Recently I wrote about my discovery that someone erased evidence on an election computer in Cumberland County, NJ. After something went wrong in a Primary Election in June 2011, the Superior Court (the Hon. David E. Krell) had ordered the County Board of Elections to make the computer available for me (the Plaintiffs’ expert) to…
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What happens when the printed ballot face doesn't match the electronic ballot definition?
Part 4 of 4. Complete 4-part series available here. The Sequoia AVC Advantage is an old-technology direct-recording electronic voting machine. It doesn’t have a video display; the candidate names are printed on a large sheet of paper, and voters indicate their choices by pressing buttons that are underneath the paper. A “ballot definition” file in…
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Will the NJ Attorney General investigate the NJ Attorney General?
Part 3 of 4 In my recent posts I wrote about my discovery that (apparently) a County employee tampered with evidence in a computer that the NJ Superior Court had Ordered the County to present for examination. I described this discovery to the Court (Judge David E. Krell); and then a County employee did admit…
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Did NJ election officials fail to respect court order to improve security of elections?
Part 2 of 4 The Gusciora case was filed in 2004 by the Rutgers Constitutional Litigation Clinic on behalf of Reed Gusciora and other public-interest plaintiffs. The Plaintiffs sought to end the use of paperless direct-recording electronic voting machines, which are very vulnerable to fraud and manipulation via replacement of their software. The defendant was…
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NJ election cover-up
Part 1 of 4 During the June 2011 New Jersey primary election, something went wrong in Cumberland County, which uses Sequoia AVC Advantage direct-recording electronic voting computers. From this we learned several things: New Jersey court-ordered election-security measures have not been effectively implemented. There is a reason to believe that New Jersey election officials have…
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Why seals can't secure elections
Over the last few weeks, I’ve described the chaotic attempts of the State of New Jersey to come up with tamper-indicating seals and a seal use protocol to secure its voting machines. A seal use protocol can allow the seal user to gain some assurance that the sealed material has not been tampered with. But…
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Seals on NJ voting machines, as of 2011
Part of a multipart series starting here. During the NJ voting-machines trial, plaintiffs’ expert witness Roger Johnston testified that the State’s attempt to secure its AVC Advantage voting machines was completely ineffective: the seals were ill-chosen, the all-important seal use protocol was entirely missing, and anyway the physical design of this voting machine makes it…
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Seals on NJ voting machines, March 2009
During the NJ voting-machines trial, both Roger Johnston and I showed different ways of removing all the seals from voting machines and putting them back without evidence of tampering. The significance of this is that one can then install fraudulent vote-stealing software in the computer. The State responded by switching seals yet again, right in…
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What an expert on seals has to say
During the New Jersey voting machines lawsuit, the State defendants tried first one set of security seals and then another in their vain attempts to show that the ROM chips containing vote-counting software could be protected against fraudulent replacement. After one or two rounds of this, Plaintiffs engaged Dr. Roger Johnston, an expert on physical…
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The trick to defeating tamper-indicating seals
In this post I’ll tell you the trick to defeating physical tamper-evident seals. When I signed on as an expert witness in the New Jersey voting-machines lawsuit, voting machines in New Jersey used hardly any security seals. The primary issues were in my main areas of expertise: computer science and computer security. Even so, when…