Category: Voting
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Paper fingerprinting and ballot tracking
In part 1 of this 2-part series I explained: Some election-integrity advocates have suggested that, in addition to good chain-of-custody procedures for ballots between when they’re cast and when they’re counted (or recounted), we should have better control over what paper (and paper ballots) go into the polling place. This way, if fraudulent ballots got…
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Flaky paper won’t secure our elections without a protocol to go with it
Part 1 of a 2-part series. In this part, why just printing ballots on special paper won’t help much. In part 2, how special paper could have a role if the rest of the system were developed to go with it. How can we best ensure that the ballots tallied are the same ones that…
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CAC-Vote: Another Insecure Internet Voting System
Philip Stark and I have released this paper with an analysis of a DARPA-sponsored research project to develop an internet voting system. An Internet Voting System Fatally Flawed in Creative New Ways Abstract: The recently published “MERGE” protocol is designed to be used in the prototype CAC-vote system. The voting kiosk and protocol transmit votes…
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Rows and Columns, the County Line, and the ExpressVote XL
Why did New Jersey counties keep choosing one insecure voting machine after another, for decades? Only this year did I realize what the reason might be. A century ago, New Jersey (like many other states) adopted lever voting machines that listed the offices by row, with the parties (and their candidates) across the columns: The…
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Barcodes on paper ballots: the good, the bad, and the stealth
Paper ballots should not have barcodes to mark votes; paper ballots should have barcodes to mark ballot styles. Why is that? What’s the difference? And at the end, I describe a useful innovation from a company called Voting.works. One of the most important reasons we use paper ballots in elections is to protect our elections…
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Suggested Principles for State Statutes Regarding Ballot Marking and Vote Tabulation
This letter, signed by more than 20 election cybersecurity experts, was addressed to the Pennsylvania State Senate Committee on Government in response to a request for policy advice, but it applies in any state — especially those that use Ballot Marking Devices for all in-person voters: Georgia and South Carolina; most counties in Arkansas, New…
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Switzerland’s e-voting system has predictable implementation blunder
Last year, I published a 5-part series about Switzerland’s e-voting system. Like any internet voting system, it has inherent security vulnerabilities: if there are malicious insiders, they can corrupt the vote count; and if thousands of voters’ computers are hacked by malware, the malware can change votes as they are transmitted. Switzerland “solves” the…
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A reasonably priced Ballot On Demand system from Hart Intercivic
To run vote centers that must supply many different ballot styles, for hand-markable paper ballots to be counted by optical scanners, it’s convenient and effective to use ballot-on-demand (BOD) printers. When the voter signs in at the vote center, the BOD laser printer produces a hand-markable optical scan ballot, with the appropriate choice of contests…
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Searcy County Arkansas switches to hand-marked paper ballots
Almost all Arkansas counties have been using ballot-marking devices (BMDs) in their elections. Searcy County has just chosen to switch to hand-marked (fill-in-the-oval) paper ballots, which will be counted by machine (for an unofficial, immediate count) and then counted by hand (for an official, certified count). Hand counting all the ballots might be impractical in…
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ExpressVote XL “fix” doesn’t fix anything
Five years ago I described a serious security flaw in the design of all-in-one voting machines made by two competing manufacturers, ES&S and Dominion. These all-in-one machines work like this: the voter indicates choices on a touchscreen; then a printer prints the votes onto a paper ballot; the voter has a chance to review the…