Category: Uncategorized
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ThreeBallot and Write-Ins
Yesterday I wrote about Ron Rivest’s ThreeBallot voting system. Today I want to start a discussion of problems with the system. (To reiterate: the purpose of this kind of criticism is not to dump on the designer but to advance our collective understanding of voting system design.) Charlie Strauss and Andrew Appel have more thorough…
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ThreeBallot
ThreeBallot is a new voting method from Ron Rivest that is supposed to make elections more secure without compromising voter privacy. It got favorable reviews at first – Michael Shamos even endorsed it at a congressional hearing – but further analysis shows that it has some serious problems. The story of ThreeBallot and its difficulties…
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Dutch E-Voting System Has Problems Similar to Diebold's
A team of Dutch researchers, led by Rop Gonggrijp and Willem-Jan Hengeveld, managed to acquire and analyze a Nedap/Groenendaal e-voting machine used widely in the Netherlands and Germany. They report problems strikingly similar to the ones Ari Feldman, Alex Halderman and I found in the Diebold AccuVote-TS. The N/G machines all seem to be opened…
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Immunizing the Internet
Can computer crime be beneficial? That’s the question asked by a provocative note, “Immunizing the Internet, or: How I Learned to Stop Worrying and Love the Worm,” by an anonymous author in June’s Harvard Law Review. The note argues that some network attacks, though illegal, can be beneficial in the long run by bringing attention…
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HP Spokesman Says Company Regrets Spying on Him
As most people know by now, Hewlett-Packard was recently caught spying on its directors and employees, and some reporters, using methods that are probably illegal and certainly unethical. Throughout the scandal, we’ve heard a lot from HP spokesman Mike Moeller. This got my attention because Mike was my next-door neighbor in Palo Alto during my…
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E-Voting Testimony
Today at 10:00 AM Eastern I’m testifying at a House Administration Committee hearing on e-voting. Here is the written testimony I submitted.
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Networking Diebold Voting Machines
Reacting to our report about their AccuVote-TS e-voting product, Diebold spokesmen are claiming that the machines are never networked. For example, Diebold’s official written response to our report says that the AccuVote-TS “is never attached to a network” and again that “These touch screen voting stations are standalone units that are never networked together.” This…
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Honest Election Workers
One of Diebold’s responses to our paper and video about their products’ security is that election workers are honest and would never do anything to corrupt an election. Like many of Diebold’s arguments, this one is mostly true but almost entirely irrelevant. The overwhelming majority of election workers are honest and diligent. They put in…
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Refuting Diebold's Response
Diebold issued a response to our e-voting report. While we feel our paper already addresses all the issues they raise, here is a point by point rebuttal. Diebold’s statement is in italics, our response in normal type. Three people from the Center for Information Technology Policy and Department of Computer Science at Princeton University today…
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"Hotel Minibar" Keys Open Diebold Voting Machines
Like other computer scientists who have studied Diebold voting machines, we were surprised at the apparent carelessness of Diebold’s security design. It can be hard to convey this to nonexperts, because the examples are technical. To security practitioners, the use of a fixed, unchangeable encryption key and the blind acceptance of every software update offered…