Eric Rescorla reports that, in a talk at WEIS, Dan Geer predicted (or possibly advocated) that end-users will be held liable for security breaches in their machines that cause harm to others.
As Eric notes, there is a good theoretical argument for this:
There are two kinds of costs to not securing your computer:
- Internal costs: the costs to you of having your own machine broken into.
- External costs: the costs to others of having your machine being broken into, primarily your machine being used as a platform for other attacks.
Currently, the only incentive you currently have is the internal costs. That incentive clearly isn’t that strong, as lots of people don’t upgrade their systems. The point of liability is to get you to also bear the external costs, which helps give you the right incentive to secure your systems.
Eric continues, astutely, by wondering whether it’s actually worthwhile, economically, for users to spend lots of money and effort trying to secure their systems. If the cost of securing your computer exceeds the cost (internal and external) of not doing so, then the optimal choice is simply to accept the cost of breaches; and that’s what you’ll do, even if you’re liable.
There’s at least one more serious difficulty with end-user liability. Today, many intrusions into end-user machines lead to the installation of “bots” that the intruder uses later to send spam, launch denial of service attacks, or make other mischief. The harm caused by these bots is often diffuse.
For example, suppose Alice’s machine is compromised and the intruder uses it to send 100,000 spam emails, each of which costs its recipient five cents to delete. Alice’s insecurity has led to $5,000 of total harm. But who is going to sue Alice? No individual has suffered more than a few cents’ worth of harm. Even if all of the affected parties can somehow put together an action against Alice, the administrative and legal costs of the action (not to mention the cost of identifying Alice in the first place) will be much more than $5,000. In aggregate, all of the world’s Alices may be causing plenty of harm, but the costs of holding each particular Alice responsible may be excessive.
So, to the extent that the external costs of end-user insecurity are diffuse, end-user liability may do very little good. Maybe there is another way to internalize the external costs of end-user insecurity; but I’m not sure what it might be.
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